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I. INTRODUCTION
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1,1 the United States Supreme Court rejected voluntary deseg-
regation plans in Seattle, Washington and Jefferson County, Kentucky
that, in pursuit of the integrative ideal, employed the use of race in stu-
dent assignment. This decision has sent scholars and policy makers who
are interested in pursuing race conscious remedies to address systemic
racism and the resulting educational performance gap scrambling to un-
derstand the limitations imposed by the decision.
Many of these scholars and reformers have been guided by Chief
Justice Earl Warren's admonition in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown 1) that "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."2 In
Brown I, the United States Supreme Court affirmed educational opportu-
nity as firmly implanted in the lexicon of fundamental rights upon which
the American concept of democracy is based.3 A plurality of the Justices
in Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) seems to retreat from
the promise of Brown. This appears to result from the plurality proceed-
ing from an ahistorical, non-contextual understanding of American
schooling. The majority opinion informs us that while "remedying the
effects of past intentional discrimination is a compelling state interest
under the strict scrutiny test," such an interest is not implicated in PICS
t Assistant Professor, Charlotte School of Law. Thanks to Margaret Beale Spencer, Gregory Seaton,
along with the participants in the Brown Undone? The Future of Integration in Seattle After PICS
Symposium for comments on an earlier version of this Article.
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
3. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 42 (1987); JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION 80 (1966).
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because "the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to
court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation order decree to which
Jefferson County schools were previously subject has been dissolved.",
4
Such a holding seems to overlook the fact that for far too many
black and Latino students, the promise of Brown is not met.5 It is not
met because many students of color are trapped in racially and economi-
cally isolated urban schools. In the late 1960s, while urban America
burned, President Johnson appointed a National Advisory Committee on
Civil Disorders to determine the factors leading to the riots and ethnic
uprisings. The resulting report, known as the Kerner Commission Re-
port, identified the ghettoization of America's cities as a primary cause
of the civil unrest. The isolation we see today is a continuation along a
path identified by the Kerner Commission Report towards two nations:
one White and one Black, separate and unequal.6 While the split may no
longer be a binary black and white one, it still continues.
While our cities may not be burning today, the maintenance of a
system of ghetto schools provides the tinder from which they may ignite
again. Educational reformers face a daunting task in their efforts to ad-
dress the impact of the educational achievement gap. Reformers cannot
address only a single issue and hope to adequately understand or amelio-
rate educational failure: the problem has too many facets. America's
schools continue to be racially, ethnically, and economically segregated,
and classrooms that had been integrated are re-segregating at a rapid
7pace.
It is clear that the achievement gap in and of itself is not enough to
allow for race conscious reforms. The Court in PICS did not reach the
question of the effect, if any, of the school districts plans on addressing
achievement gap issues. It was the opinion of the four-person plurality
of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice
Alito that the Court need not resolve the parties' dispute over whether
racial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores because it
4. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2742 (emphasis added).
5. See ERICKA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEE, AND GARY ORFIELD, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? (2003),
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucia.edu/research/resegO3/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
6. Kerner Commission, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(1968).
7. GARY ORFIELD AND CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT/PROYECTO
DERECHOS CIVILES, UCLA, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND
THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES (2007),
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/reversals resegneed.pdf.
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is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored to
that asserted goal.8
Somewhat frustrated with the Court in PICS, I looked back to
Brown to see what, if anything, could be salvaged. In rereading the
Brown decision it occurred to me that it was the acknowledgment of con-
text that allowed the Court to reject the precedent of Plessy.9 In Plessy,
the Court found that if "the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority," then it is "solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."' 0 In Brown,
the Court found, at least in the education context, that racial separation
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 1
This shift is an acknowledgment of the fact that context matters as
demonstrated through the research captured in footnote eleven. Footnote
eleven is often (dismissively, I would argue) referred to as the social sci-
ence footnote. 12 The footnote in fact cites to psychological, 13 sociologi-
cal, 14 historical,' 5 and economic' 6 research on the impact and causes of
segregation. Almost from the moment the decision was issued, there has
been criticism of the courts reliance on the Dr. Kenneth Clark's psycho-
logical evidence.' 7 While the interrogation of Kenneth Clark's research
8. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2755 (2007).
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. Id. at 551.
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
12. Id. at 495 n. 11; see also Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context:
Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 803-14 (2002)
(describing the continuing debate over footnote 11).
13. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.1 I (citing K. B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (Midcentury White House Conference on Chil-
dren and Youth, 1950); HELEN WITMER & RUTH KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING; THE
FACT-FINDING REPORT OF THE MIDCENTURY WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND
YOUTH (1952); Max Deutscher & Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation:
A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); Isidor Chein, What are the Psycho-
logical Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT. J. OPINION AND
ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949)).
14. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n. 11 (citing THEODORE BRAMELD, EDUCATIONAL COSTS, IN
DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE, 44-48 (R. M. Maclver ed., 1949)).
15. Id. (citing E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 674-81 (1949)).
16. Id. (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944)).
17. See generally Kenneth B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scien-
tists'Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224 (1959-60) (supporting the use of social science evidence in desegre-
gation cases); Stuart W. Cook, Social Science and School Desegregation: Did We Mislead the Su-
preme Court?, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 420 (1979) (evaluating the validity of
sources cited in Brown in light of subsequent research); Harold B. Gerard, School Desegregation:
The Social Science Role, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 869 (1983) (criticizing the science cited in Brown);
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methods is appropriate, it does not mean that psychological evidence is
inherently unreliable.
In fact, I posit that psychological evidence is necessary, if not es-
sential, to the understanding and development of remedies and legal
strategies to address the pedagogical problems that result from our pre-
sent system of racial and economically segregated schools. To this end, I
will examine the use of developmental theory to inspect and address ra-
cial isolation in America's schools.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II considers the historical
and social context that led to the ultimate successful strategy in Brown.
Although times may have changed, my ultimate argument is that con-
texts matters; as such, to fully understand Brown, we must understand
the strategy behind it and the road that takes us from Plessy to Brown.
Part III considers the trends that led to Brown's undoing. While Brown I
offers no remedy and Brown II provides that schools should be desegre-
gated "with all deliberate speed," 18 one must understand the societal
shifts that occurred, fundamentally changing the context under which
education reform operated. Finally, Part IV generates a proposal for a
basis for a footnote eleven for the twenty-first century. Specifically, I
examine what would be the psychological structure necessary to under-
stand our current context. As we depart from the black-white binary,
how do we address group processes?
II. THE BASIS FOR BROWN: UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL AND
SOCIAL CONTEXT LEADING TO BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
A. Historical Context: The Pre-Brown
Battle for Educational Reform in the Courts
The plurality in PICS bases their opinion on a conception of "color
blind" constitutionalism while also arguing that their belief is consistent
with not only Brown, but also with the theory of the case supported by
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.19 This, I would argue, is clearly an
ahistorical analysis. A historical analysis is necessary to unpack the
PICS Court's claim of color blind constitutionalism and to understand
the true meaning of the holding in Brown. To this end, it is necessary to
understand the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's strategy and the history
behind it.
Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor
Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69 (1960) (criticizing Kenneth Clark's article).
18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11) 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
19. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2782 (2007).
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The victory in Brown was the product of twenty-odd years of litiga-
tion for educational equity and an even longer legal struggle for civil
rights. 20 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund made a logistical decision to
"build a string of precedents, one victory leading to and supporting the
next.",21 While the ultimate aim was to overturn the legacy of Plessy v.
22Ferguson, this was only accomplished by first attacking the inequity
inherent in separate but equal.
The strategy to overturn Plessy was constructed by Nathan Mar-
gold, an attorney hired by the NAACP during the height of the Great De-
pression, who believed that the states' cost to sustain an equitable dual
system would be too great, thus forcing integration.23 The plan was
overseen by Charles Hamilton Houston, the Dean of Howard Law
School. During Houston's time as dean at Howard, the school was de-
scribed as "a living laboratory where civil-rights law was invented by
teamwork., 24 It almost seems ironic now that attorneys for the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund chose to begin with graduate schools in light of the
Court's holdings in Grutter25 and PICS, which, in the former, found di-
versity a compelling interest in the graduate school context (specifically
Michigan Law school's admissions program was found to be constitu-
tional), but in the latter, found it was not a compelling interest in the pri-
mary and secondary school context. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund
made this decision because many states did not offer graduate programs
for blacks.26 Law schools were first among graduate schools, "because
judges were of course themselves lawyers who would be most inclined to
grasp the absurdity of a separate-but-equal law school for Negroes.
27
Although there were state court victories that preceded it,28 the first
case to reach the Supreme Court was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Can-
ada.29 Before Gaines, the state of Missouri had a single law school that
only admitted whites. The state had devised a plan that gave blacks the
option of attending law school out of state and the state of Missouri
would cover the difference in tuition between the University of Missouri
20. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OFBROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975). This work effectively captures the essen-
tial elements of the strategy implemented by the Legal Defense Fund attorneys in Brown.
21. Id. at 187.
22. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. KLUGER, supra note 20, at 134.
24. Id. at 128.
25. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
26. KLUGER, supra note 20, at 187.
27. Id.
28. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936) (succeeded in the Maryland state court on the
same theory as Gaines).
29. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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law school and the chosen school. The state of Missouri argued that
there was not enough interest to justify establishing a law school for
blacks within the state of Missouri. A highly qualified black applicant
who was denied admission to the University of Missouri law school
brought an action for mandamus to compel the university to admit him.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court found Missouri's practice to be uncon-
stitutional. The basis for the Court's holding was that
[t]he admissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment
of privileges afforded by the State rests wholly upon the equality
of the privileges which the laws give to the separated groups
within the State. The question here is not of a duty of the State
to supply legal training, or of the quality of the training which it
does supply, but of its duty when it provides such training to fur-
nish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equality
of right.3o
While the state was not required to provide legal education, if it did pro-
vide it, then it had to do so on an equal basis.
While upholding separate but equal, the Court required, for the first
time, true equity. Importantly, the Court also declared that the right to
avail oneself of the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment was a "personal one. It was as an individual that he was
entitled to the equal protection of the laws., 31 This removed the excuse
that there was not enough interest to justify a school for blacks. How-
ever, the result was not the opening of the schoolhouse door; instead,
because states looked to thwart the decision, continued litigation was
required.
States began to create black law schools or at least promised to do
so. But, it was not until ten years later, in Sipuel v. University of Okla-
homa,32 that the Supreme Court required states to supply legal education
to blacks as soon as they provided it to whites. Oklahoma had denied
Ada Sipuel's request for legal education because there were not enough
students for a black law school. The denial of Ada Sipuel's request,
based on a lack of group interest, clearly violated the holding in Gaines;
therefore, the Court in Sipuel required states to act immediately.33 The
case was remanded to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which gave the
board of regents two options:
30. Id. at 349.
31. lId. at 351.
32. Sipuel v. Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
33. Id. at 633.
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1) enroll plaintiff, if she is otherwise qualified, in the first-year class
of the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma, in which
school she will be entitled to remain on the same scholastic basis as
other students thereof until such a separate law school for negroes is
established and ready to function, or
2) not enroll any applicant of any group in said class until said sepa-
rate school is established and ready to function.
34
Ms. Sipuel married and became Mrs. Fisher and the case returned
to the United States Supreme Court in Fisher v. Hurst. The United
States Supreme Court accepted the Oklahoma court's remedy and thus,
the state's ability to delay providing Ms. Sipuel a legal education was
removed. The Oklahoma Board of Regents responded by creating a law
school in name only. A small section of the state capitol was roped off
and three law teachers were assigned to attend to the instruction of Ms.
Sipuel "and others similarly situated. 3 5 The Court in Fisher refused to
consider the question of whether a law school in name only was truly
equal. As a result, the Legal Defense Fund had to develop a new strategy.
Sweatt v. Painter and its companion case, McLaurin v. State Re-
gents for Higher Ed., 36 provided the next steps in the challenge to sepa-
rate but equal. Sweatt challenged the claims that the new "Negro
Schools" were in fact equal. The Supreme Court found that the segre-
gated law school in question was not equal and more importantly, that a
segregated law school could never be equal to the University of Texas
Law School.37 Although the court could not find the schools equal using
measurable factors, such as number of faculty, variety of courses and
opportunity for specialization or size of the library, this did not provide
the grounds for the Court's holding. Rather, it was on the basis of "in-
tangibles" that the Court found the schools could never be equal:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School
possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are inca-
pable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in
a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputa-
tion of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions
and prestige.38
34. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 149 (1948).
35. KLUGER, supra note 20, at 259.
36. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. State Regents for Higher Ed., 339
U.S. 637 (1950).
37. Id. at 634.
38. Id.
20081
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McLaurin dealt with the treatment of students once they were admitted to
the formally all white institutions. The Supreme Court found that
segregating students within an institution also violated the Fourteenth
Amendment: A student "having been admitted to a state-supported
graduate school, must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state
as students of other races.", 39 These higher education cases provided a
legal framework through which Thurgood Marshall, once a student of
Charles Houston at Howard and now the lead attorney for the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, could begin the attack on segregation in primary
education.
B. Social Context: The Role of Science Research and
Social Construction in the Development of Brown
Brown built not only on the precedents discussed above, but also on
developments in social science research. When the Brown strategy was
initially formulated, the United States was in the midst of the Great De-
pression; by the time it was argued, the country had entered the post-
World War II boom. Counting on the states' inability to provide equal
separate facilities was no longer reliable, so it became necessary to estab-
lish the harm of segregation and to acknowledge the reality of white su-
premacy. Providing evidence of both harm and the power imbalance
caused by our racial caste system required a research base. The research
base that developed ultimately provided the basis for footnote eleven.
Myrdal's An American Dilemma4' became yet another in a long
string of texts to identify racism as the continuing issue holding back
American progress. Myrdal documented from the perspective of an
economist "the vicious circle of cumulative causation" 42 that existed in
America. Blacks began at a disadvantage as a result not only of slavery
but also from the racial caste system that followed it. Discrimination,
Myrdal argued, is rooted in a tradition of economic exploitation.
The very fact that the masses of Negroes, because of economic dis-
crimination-partly caused by social inequality-are prevented
from entering even the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, are
39. McLaurin v. Oklahoma Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950).
40. In footnote 11 in Brown, the Court presents the social science research to establish the
detrimental effects of segregation and support the decision. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
495 n.1 (1954).
41. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1944).
42. Id. at 207.
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paid low wages and, consequently, are poor gives in its turn motiva-
tion for continued social discrimination.
4 3
This construction clearly addresses the majority holding in Plessy.
One cannot view segregation laws as neutral when it is clear that they are
causal because they work to institutionalize a system of exploitation. It
was only the Harlan dissent that acknowledged the supremacy of white-
ness. 44 While the plurality in PICS claims allegiance with Harlan, I
would argue that that Myrdal's work contradicts the holding of the Rob-
erts plurality as well. Justice Thomas in his concurrence tells us that
"[r]acial imbalance is not segregation., 45 This allows for "racial imbal-
ance" to exist as preservation of the status quo. Such a belief limits the
use of race conscious remedies in the absence of state action. Justice
Thomas clearly states, "outside of the context of remediation for past de
jure segregation, 'integration' is simply racial balancing." 46 This clearly
ignores the systemic nature of racism that will not abate without remedial
action.
While Myrdal was documenting the economic and social harm,
others were documenting the psychic harm. The best documented of
these studies, in terms of its effect on the Brown litigation, is Kenneth
and Mamie Clark's doll studies. Dr. Kenneth Clark, like many involved
in the Brown strategy, had a Howard connection. He received his under-
graduate education and his master's degree from Howard and it was at
Howard that he began the doll studies. It is more accurate to say that his
wife Mamie began the studies, which started when she was a student in
Dr. Clark's abnormal psychology class at Howard. She began the studies
with school children in Washington, D.C. in attempt to understand the
effect of race on black children's self identity.47 They began publishing
their findings as early as 1939 in the Journal of Social Psychology. In
the 1940s, Kenneth Clark pursed his doctorate at Columbia University
and Mamie received her master at the City University of New York and
then also received her doctorate from Columbia.
The Clarks' doll study consisted of showing black children in the
three- to seven-year-old range four dolls, two brown and two white. The
first part of the experiment tested the child's awareness of their "negri-
tude." They were simply asked to give the researcher the colored doll or
the white doll. Three quarters of the students could correctly identify the
dolls. The more famous part of the experiment was the second part when
43. ld. at 381.
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
45. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2769 (2007).
46. Id. at 2769 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
47. KLUGER, supra note 20, at 317.
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the children were asked to "give me the doll you would like to play with"
or the "doll you like best" and then were asked to "give me the doll that
looks bad" or "give me the doll that is a nice color." The majority of
black children tested indicated an "unmistakable preference" for the
white doll and rejection of the brown doll in both the North and the
South.48 The Clarks, among others, interpreted this to be a sign of low
self-esteem. Thus, Kenneth Clark's monograph argued that black chil-
dren were psychologically damaged by segregation, and as noted, many
observers credited this evidence as a deciding factor in the Brown deci-
sion.
Even outside of the study, Kenneth Clark was an active member of
the litigation process and was put in charge of developing a cogent ar-
gument with the social science experts who testified in support of the
plaintiffs in Brown. As a result:
As Thurgood Marshall sought to convince the Supreme Court to
sweep aside the conniving legalisms of past decisions upholding
Jim Crow law, he therefore had the benefit of a half-century evolu-
tion in the social sciences that declared segregation to be both a
cause and a result of the victimization of black America.
49
With the social science support, Marshall was successful and the Court in
Brown overturned Plessy's finding:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferi-
ority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the moti-
vation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental
development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racial(ly) integrated school
system. 5o
Moreover, the Court also held that "whatever may have been the extent
of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this find-
ing is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected."
51
For education equity litigation, Brown provided two landmark prin-
ciples even beyond its landmark finding for racial justice. The first was
48. Id. at 317-18.
49. Id. at 314.
50. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
51. Id.
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that equality could not be determined merely by reference to tangible
factors.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here,
unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro
and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and
salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision,
therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the
cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on
public education.
5 2
The second principle, and perhaps almost as important as the first, was
the beginning of the construction of education as a right.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is re-
quired in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional train-
ing, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.53
It should be noted that the same day the Supreme Court decided
Brown I, they also reached a similar conclusion in Brown's companion
case Bolling v. Sharpe.54 This often overlooked case is important be-
cause the Court allows that, where discrimination is egregious enough, it
can offend not only the equal protection provisions but due process as
well. The Court held:
[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stem-
ming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually ex-
clusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit
safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law,"
and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always
interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized,
52. Id. at 492.
53. Id. at 492-93.
54. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Because the Fourteenth Amendment only applies
to the states, Brown was not applicable to the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion using the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
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discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.55
These cases began what Wise refers to as the "egalitarian revolu-
tion" and the result was the "emerging primacy of equality as a guide to
constitutional decision." 56 The Brown decision proved to be the begin-
ning of a civil rights revolution and a new era in public law litigation.
With education established as a right, new era educational equity litiga-
tion sought to determine the extent of the right and the remedies that
flowed from that right.
III. TRENDING TOWARDS APARTHEID: WHY SEGREGATION
MATTERS IN A POST-DEJURE CONTEXT
Calls for color-blind constitutionalism ignore the reality of many
Americans of color because racial isolation tells only part of the story.
Segregation by race is "systematically linked to other forms of segrega-
tion, including segregation by socioeconomic status, by residential loca-
tion, and increasingly by language. 57 This segregation is more often
than not found in urban centers that have been largely abandoned by
white and middle class flight to the suburbs. 58 These urban centers are
marred by poor housing stock, weak and failing infrastructure, poor job
prospects and municipal overburden, all which work together to ad-
versely impact educational success. 59 The present state of many urban
centers is of concern because there is a strong correlation between con-
centrated poverty and academic failure. The gap in graduation rates be-
tween districts with high and low poverty rates was 18.4 percent in 2001;
this is higher than the gap seen between majority-white and majority-
minority school districts.6 °
Many conservative theorists call for hard work and personal re-
sponsibility, but such calls do not acknowledge major shifts in the
American economy. When the post-industrial economy emerged in the
U.S., there was a bifurcation of the middle class. Consequently, income
inequality grew, poverty deepened, and the "stratification in the
55. Id. at 499.
56. ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 22 (1968).
57. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY
AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 14 (2005), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/WhySegregMatters.pdf.
58. Id.
59. See id.; RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2004).
60. Christopher B. Swanson, Sketching a Portrait of Public High School Graduation: Who
Graduates? Who Doesn't?, in DROPOUTS IN AMERICA 29 (Gary Orfield ed., 2004).
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socio-economic sphere was accompanied by a growing spatial separation
between classes in the spatial sphere.",6' This racial and economic segre-
gation has been mirrored by the Supreme Court's retreat from the prom-
ise in Brown.
Beginning with Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken /),62 the Supreme
Court began its retreat from attempting to achieve racial integration in
America's schools. Milliken I rejected a remedy that would have created
a "metropolitan" school district encompassing Detroit, Michigan and its
surrounding suburbs. The Court held that, unless a constitutional viola-
tion on the part of one of the suburban districts could be shown to have
led to segregation in the urban districts, inter-district remedies were not
allowed.63 This was the beginning of the end to federal supervision of
desegregation plans. In Milliken 1,64 the Supreme Court held that the
state could pay for educational programs to repair the harm caused by
segregation. Gary Orfield, the head of the Civil Rights Project, called this
a return to "separate but equal" because it allowed states to maintain seg-
regated school systems as long as they attempted to address the underly-
ing harm.65
In Board of Education Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,
66
the Supreme Court established a "good faith" test which allows courts to
relinquish supervision over desegregation orders once a district has
shown a good faith effort to comply with the order and to eliminate seg-
regation "to the extent practicable., 67 In Freeman v. Pitts,68 the Supreme
Court allowed courts to withdraw supervision of desegregation cases in
incremental stages over those areas where the school district has com-
plied, provided that the good faith standard articulated in Dowell is met.
Once the standard was met, districts are declared unitary (non-
segregated) and removed from court supervision.
Even with the slow retreat over the last thirty-four years, the Su-
preme Court's holding in PICS came, if not as a surprise, at least as a
disappointment. The Court's holding in Grutter left hope that we might
prevail under a diversity argument. The holding in PICS diminished our
hope but did not extinguish it. The case had no impact whatsoever on
61. Douglas S. Massey & Mary J. Fischer, How Segregation Concentrates Poverty, 23(4)
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 670 (2000).
62. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
63. Id. at 746-47.
64. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
65. GARY ORFIELD, TURNING BACK TO SEGREGATION, IN DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1, 2 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton
eds., 1996).
66. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
67. Id. at 249-50.
68. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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the districts still under court order. For example, an empirical study of
192 school districts under desegregation orders found that in the vast ma-
jority of instances, the desegregation order continued with no hint of im-
pending termination. Instead, the cases simply "suffer from extreme ne-
glect," with little action taking place for years at a time. 69 The fact that
these cases are open leaves hope that they can be used to implement re-
form to address the educational problems affecting segregated communi-
ties. And the Court still allows for the use of race if it can meet the strict
scrutiny standard whatever that may be.
IV. FOOTNOTE ELEVEN FOR THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY
A. Multidiciplinarity: The
Search for a Workable Theory
As the Court retreats from Brown under the cover of color-blind
constitutionalism, those of us who still believe that race matters still look
to Brown to see what we can salvage. Ultimately, reform, even through
the courts, is subject to the political will of the masses. For this reason,
in the desegregation context, like most other educational reform efforts, a
research base is required. Research on the positive impact of integrated
settings no longer holds sway, and as such, race conscious voluntary de-
segregation plans that address de facto segregation must now develop a
new form of support. In this Part, I explore how social science has been
used in the post-Brown context and formulate a psychological approach
that would work with twenty-first century jurisprudence.
The Brown decision has in and of itself provided important guid-
ance for those seeking to use the courts for social justice ends.7 ° Michael
Heise, a leading legal education scholar, found that the structure of
Brown, specifically the use of social science evidence, had two underana-
lyzed consequences, one "the empiricization of equal educational oppor-
tunity doctrine," and two, the "empiricized equal educational opportunity
doctrine's contribution to an increasingly multidisciplinary law., 71 The
search for empirical evidence requires the development of a research
base. Law, while theoretical, builds upon philosophical theory more
aligned with the humanities than with science. The move towards em-
piricization required the development of theory-based remedies. The
lack of a fixed theory led to the adoption in law of multiple non-legal
theories or what Heise refers to multidisciplinarity. He defines the
69. Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1190 (2000).
70. See Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005).
71. Id. at 296.
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concept as law that is "increasingly welcoming of previously ignored
nonlegal sources, disciplines, and influences. 72
B. Using Ecological Theory to Contextualize the
Role of Race Conscious Remedies for Education
I chose to concentrate on psychological context. The Clarks' doll
studies were important because they evidenced quantifiable harm as a
result of state sponsored segregation. In the post-Brown litigation "psy-
chological damage flowing from state-sponsored school segregation was
no longer apt.",73 To address de facto segregation, a theory was needed
that addressed harms related to attending racially isolated schools. 74 In a
post PICS era a new and different theory is needed, a theory that helps to
understand the lived experiences of students and the supports and stress-
ors under which they do or do not function. Such a theory provides the
promise for constructing a more structured and contextual way to exam-
ine racial isolation.
A developmental theory is most appropriate for two reasons. First,
because developmental theory is cognizant of culture, it allows for cross-
cultural understanding. This can take us away from the binary construc-
tion of race as black and white, while providing an understanding of how
to create reforms consistent with a theory of interest convergence. 75 Sec-
ond, developmental theory allows for an understanding of how positive
group identity can be balanced with the integrative ideal.
Because developmental theory is broad, for my purpose I chose to
concentrate on the Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems
Theory (PVEST) developed by Margaret Beale Spencer, Ph.D. PVEST is
a human development framework that acknowledges the critical role of
the individual's perceptions.76 The theory focuses on identity formation
while considering structural factors, cultural influences, and individual
72. Id. at 308.
73. Id. at 297.
74. Id.
75. Interest convergence is the notion that both racism and seemingly anti-racist measures
advance the interests of the majority group, white Americans. Proceeding under such a theory one
will assume that social changes occur that benefit people of color (or at least seem to benefit people
of color), it is only because the interests of whites (particularly elite whites) and people of color
(sometimes only particular groups of people of color) have temporarily converged. See RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001); Derrick J. Bell,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,93 HARVARD L. REV. 518,
518-33 (1980).
76. Margaret Beale Spencer, Phenomenology and Ecological Systems Theory: Development of
Diverse Groups, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 829 (William Damon and Richard M.
Lerner eds., forthcoming 2008); Margaret Beale Spencer, Old Issues and New Theorizing about
African American Youth, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN YOUTH 37 (R.L. Taylor ed., 1995).
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perceptions of one's self, significant others, life experiences, and the en-
vironments in which one lives and copes, while navigating across myriad
social and physical contexts. As such the systems framework is concep-
tualized as an identity-focused cultural ecological (ICE) perspective.77
Identity formation takes place across the life course and is especially
relevant for adolescents given their heightened self-consciousness during
a particular period of development. PVEST combines its emphasis on
individual perceptions with Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems the-
ory, 8 linking context and perception.
While Bronfenbrenner's model provides a means for describing the
ways in which multiple levels of context can influence individual devel-
opment, PVEST also directly illustrates life course human development
within context. In doing so, it emphasizes the individual's meaning-
making processes that underlie identity development and behavioral out-
comes. 79 The character of these processes and outcomes are associated
with the developmental tasks and maturational themes associated with a
particular developmental period. For example, given the identity empha-
sis of Erikson's theory, 80 an infant's development of trust as linked to
life course identity issues is not independent of, but is associated with,
the nature of identity achievement themes of critical importance to the
adolescent.
An emphasis on identity formation as linked to behavioral out-
comes is important because most theories of development assume a pri-
ori deviance and psychopathology for high vulnerability populations and
positive outcomes for low vulnerability (i.e., high resource) populations.
Yet, they cannot explain diverse outcomes in shared contexts. Examples
might include siblings who develop within the same family, neighbor-
hood, and socioeconomic status, but who demonstrate different life-stage
outcomes such as graduation from high school versus incarceration in a
juvenile facility. Additionally, the youthful perpetrators of the Colum-
bine Massacre had life outcomes quite different from the trajectory
stereotypically expected of middle class students or youth from affluent
families.
77. Beale, Phenomenology, supra note 76, at 829.
78. URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY
NATURE AND DESIGN (1979).
79. Margaret Beale Spencer, A Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory
(P VEST): A Self-Organization Perspective in Context, 9 DEV. AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 817-33
(1999); Margaret Beale Spencer, Social and Cultural Influences on School Adjustment: The Applica-
tion of an Identity-Focused Cultural Ecological Perspective, 34 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 43-57
(1999).
80. Erik Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES 1 (1959).
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C. Phenomenological Variant of Ecological Systems Theory
The PVEST model (see Fig. 1) consists of five basic components
that form a dynamic, theoretical system applicable to any period of the
life course. These five components, (1) Net Vulnerability Level, (2) Net
Stress Engagement, (3) Reactive Coping Methods, (4) Emergent Identi-
ties, and (5) Life-Stage Coping Outcomes, help us understand the process
by which individuals process their environment.
1. Net Vulnerability Level
The first component, Net Vulnerability Level, consists of individ-
ual, family, and community characteristics that may serve as risk or pro-
tective factors during an individual's development. The risks, of course,
may be offset by protective factors (e.g., additional instrumental, emo-
tional, or financial support provided by family or non-blood kin), thus
defining net vulnerability for a given individual. For marginalized indi-
viduals (e.g., immigrants, youth of color, and low resource citizens),
these risk factors can include socioeconomic conditions such as living in
poverty as well as imposed expectations based on race, affluence, and
gender stereotypes. In sum, net vulnerability refers to the balance be-
tween risk factor versus protective factor presence. Accordingly, a
highly vulnerable individual has an imbalance between the level of evi-
dent risks versus the accessibility of protective factors.
2. Net Stress Engagement
The second component of PVEST, Net Stress Engagement, refers
to the actual experience of stress and support that can affect an individ-
ual's well being as a function of the vulnerability previously described.
In contrast to the risk factors noted in the Net Vulnerability Level, the
stressors represent actually transformed risks encountered which, given
their impact, require a response. Available supports (personal, social, or
structural) can help individuals negotiate experiences of stress; thus, sup-
ports are actualized protective factors. Whereas risks and protective fac-
tors denote potential entities within the individual, family, or community,
stress and support refer to actual phenomenological experiences of risk
and protection in context.
The addition of an adult male to a household for example (possibly
through the marriage of a single mother to the biological father of one of
her children), may act as either a stress or a support, depending on the
context. The introduction of an adult male into the family may be per-
ceived as a support by the mother and other family members, particularly
if he adds economic resources to the household. However, the presence
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of this new adult may be perceived differently by the adolescent children
who are not biologically related to him. Adolescent males may perceive
this new presence as a loss of their role as the "man of the house" and a
serious threat to the youth's status. Adolescent females may, on the
other hand, look to the adult males for feedback and interaction to affirm
their emerging feminine identity.
3. Reactive Coping Methods
In response to stressors and in conjunction with supports, Reactive
Coping Methods, including problem-solving strategies, are employed
that can be either adaptive or maladaptive. For instance, in response to
decreased time and attention from parents, adolescents may take on more
familial responsibilities; engage in more risk taking behavior; seek
greater interaction with other kin and non-kin adults; or, like the Colum-
bine massacre perpetrators, engage in highly anti-social behavior with
similarly marginal and highly vulnerable youth.
4. Emergent Identities
As youth employ various coping strategies, self-appraisal contin-
ues, and those strategies yielding desirable results are repeated and be-
come stable coping responses which, over time, yield Emergent Identi-
ties. Emergent identities define how individuals view themselves within
and between their various contexts of development (e.g., family, school,
neighborhood, and peer group). The combination of such factors as cul-
tural/ethnic background, understandings about gender roles, and self and
peer appraisal all define one's identity.
5. Life-Stage Coping Outcomes
Identity processes provide behavioral stability over time and space
and lay the foundation for future perception, self-appraisal, and behavior;
the resulting behavior can yield adverse or productive Life-stage Coping
Outcomes. Productive outcomes can include school engagement, a sense
of agency, positive family relationships, adequate employment prepara-
tion, parenting skills, and low levels of risk behavior. On the other hand,
adverse or unproductive outcomes can include school dropout, poor
school performance, engagement in illegal means of earning income, and
teenage or out-of-wedlock child bearing.
The dynamic process of negotiating risks and supports continues
throughout life as individuals balance new risks against protective fac-
tors, encounter new stressors (potentially offset by supports), establish
more expansive coping strategies, and redefine how they view
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themselves, which also impacts how others view them. As noted by
Erikson, unresolved issues within one life stage influence future coping
81and identity formation processes. PVEST aims not only to capture this
developmental process, but to place it within its broader social contexts.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, several recurring conceptual flaws have characterized
research on racially and ethnically diverse youth.8 2 From the Clarks'
doll studies to the evening news, we are presented with concepts of black
pathology. Far too often, discussions of youth of color have lacked a
developmental perspective. African American youth specifically, and
male adolescents in particular, are treated as miniature or short adults,
rather than as progressively complex young people growing and matur-
ing across multiple domains of human functioning. This is exacerbated
by stereotyping based on pathological assumptions about youth of color.
These stereotypes impact the decision-making that continues a system of
segregated schools. Students of color are compared to the normative
Caucasian expectations that assume privilege and protection for whites,
while not understanding that all youth have both protective factors and
stressors.
Instead of defaulting to culturally based stereotypes, reforms must
acknowledge processes through which students make meaning. While
we know that racism, manifested through structural and ideological di-
mensions, is often exacerbated by economic challenges and other barri-
ers, we ignore supporting factors and then have no understanding of re-
silience. PVEST, by contextualizing the environment, provides a means
to identify supports and stressors. It is not limited to students of color.
Far too often, the needs of apparently privileged youth are also ignored
because the base assumptions ignore the fact that they may not have
learned to address stress.
It is the contextual framework that a developmental approach pro-
vides that leads me to believe that that approach provides the appropriate
base for a footnote eleven for the new millennium. It takes us away from
theories that assume black dysfunction. It allows us to understand the
lived experience of youth and to develop appropriate intervention. It
81. Id.
82. See MARGARET BEALE SPENCER & V. HARPALANi, AFRICAN AMERICAN ADOLESCENTS,
RESEARCH ON TODAY'S TEENAGER: ADOLESCENTS IN AMERICA, 30-32 (R.M. Lemer & J.V. Lemer
eds., 2001); Dena Swanson, Margaret Beale Spencer, Davido Dupree, Elizabeth Noll,& Sofia Gins-
berg, Psychological Development in Racially and Ethnically Diverse Youth: Conceptual and meth-
odological challenges in the 21st Century, 15 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 743-71 (2003).
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may even meet the requirements of the color-blind approach demanded
by courts today while still being culturally conscious.
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Figure 1. The phenomenological variant of ecological systems theory from Spencer (1995).
